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Cowboy Vs Babar Ahmad
High
Court Drama: Day 3
Thursday
13th July 2006
'The
Good Faith of Uncle S.A.M'
The third day of Babar's appeal at the High Court started slightly later than
10.30 a.m. due to problems in the video-link-up. Eventually it was fixed and the
two judges, Mr Justice Walker and Lord Justice Laws, entered the courtroom. Hugo
Keith, the barrister for the Prosecution, continued to challenge the points of appeal
raised by the Defence.
Mr Keith tackled the issue of the diplomatic assurance and how much it would be
binding upon the U.S. to honour it. He highlighted the fact that Diplomatic Note
25, issued in Babar Ahmad's case, would not only protect him from Military Commission,
but also ensured he would face trial with a “full panoply of rights”. He would also
be protected from being designated an Enemy Combatant. Mr Keith then went on to
giving a colourful lecture to the courtroom about the nature of diplomatic assurances
and that they were widely drafted on the “presumption of good faith” on part of
the U.S government.
He then addressed the Defence's point about the risk of a superseding indictment.
This is where another set of charges could be brought forward against the defendant,
thereby placing them at risk of being designated an Enemy Combatant. Edward Fitzgerald
QC, for the Defence, had earlier cited that this is something not covered by the
assurance and the appellant would then be at risk of being designated Enemy Combatant
by virtue of some other executive order under another name.
Mr Keith continued to push forward the notion of “good faith”. He acknowledged
that a diplomatic assurance was not the same as a treaty and hence not legally enforceable
by Babar Ahmad. In the U.S, Babar would not be able to enforce the promises made
on the diplomatic assurance in any court in the U.S. Even the Judge added to this
point by saying that the matter is not whether or not American sticks to the diplomatic
assurance, but rather whether the U.S. will honour it in good faiths and due to
the carious other benefits.
Extraordinary
Rendition
Mr Keith agreed that the practice of extraordinary rendition, if it
occurred, would be a fundamental breach of the appellants' human rights. Mr Keith
then was able to look the Judge in the eye and state blankly that the risk of extraordinary
rendition was simply “unreal”. He stated that both men were wanted for trial so
why would the U.S want to make them "disappear”? He simply brushed aside the
fact that Mr Fitzgerald had emphasised on a number of occasions that the risk of
Extraordinary Rendition would become very real if Babar was acquitted. In such a
case this could happen to extract more information from the defendent. Mr Keith
then reiterated his favourite two words for the day, “good faith”, and the fact
that there was no evidence to “rebut the presumption of good faith” from the U.S.
Mr Fitzgerald had repeatedly emphasised to the Court that presumption of “good faith” was
not enough as an assurance and one has to look at the facts.
Mr Keith then attacked the Defence's case study of Maher Arar who was rendered
from the U.S, which was supported by the sworn evidence of a diplomat. He tried
to brush aside the seriousness of the case study by stating that Arar was not an “extraditee” as
Babar Ahmad would be, and therefore that evidence was misconstrued. Yet again he
stated that the spirit of the U.S. 's “good faith” was suggestive of the fact that
they would render the appellants.
Special Administrative Measures (S.A.M.'s)
With regards to these, the Prosecution addressed the following points:
The alleged discriminatory nature: Once again Mr Keith cited bluntly
that there was no evidence to support the fact that S.A.M.'s will be imposed on
the basis of race and religion. Despite numerous requests by the Defence to the
Prosecution to provide the figures for exactly how many Muslims were subjected to
S.A.M.'s in comparison to non-Muslims, they had failed to provide these. Instead
they provided inadequate statistics from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which manages
mainly post-conviction inmates. The Defence found these unsatisfactory as they had
also requested pre-trial figures and on the previous day had requested the Judge
to order them to provide the full statistics. Instead of agreeing to provide the
figures, Mr Keith stated that S.A.M.'s were applied to the most dangerous individuals
who had involvement in cause of death or serious injury. Since most terrorists were
of the Islamic faith, it would therefore be inevitable that there would be a higher
proportion of Muslims under S.A.M.'s
Human rights violations: Solitary Confinement in itself was not a
violation of one's human rights and is dependent on the nature and length of confinement.
Mr Keith also tried to convince the Court that since S.A.M.'s could be challenged,
they preserved the basic rights of the individual. However, Mr Keith stopped short
of mentioning the fact that there was yet to be a successful challenge by an inmate
to the S.A.M.'s he had been placed under and moreover, the appeals process was non-systematic
and haphazard.
Mr Keith them concluded by stating that it was impossible to know
whether the risk of S.A.M.'s was a real one and how likely it would be that they
would be applied to the individuals in question.
Mr Hardy, who had replaced his cowboy hat for a wig on this occasion, then stood
to enlighten the Courtroom about the various points of law regarding the Extradition
Treaty and its wording. He began by stating that a Diplomatic Note not being binding
by International Law was a minor point. The UK and U.S. had extradition agreements
dating back to 1842 and the alliance between the two countries was indisputably
strong. It would therefore not be in the U.S. 's best interests to disregard the
assurance. He also stated that there was no evidence that an assurance such as this
had ever been broken. Assurances with other countries had also been adhered to by
the United States . The Defence later quashed this point by the fact that this was
a weak argument because an assurance which covered such a broad range of circumstances
had never been given before concerning extraditions. Most previous assurances were
given against specific situations such as the application of the death penalty,
or the length of a given sentence.
Mr Hardy then tried to convince the Court that a state may give up an individual
at the request of another but that it would still retain some level of sovereignty
and protection over that individual. For that reason, it would be unlikely that
Extraordinary Rendition would occur to the appellants. He did concede to the fact
that the practice of Extraordinary Rendition is prohibited but stopped short of
admitting that the U.S. practices it worldwide.
With regards to S.A.M.'s, Mr Hardy was clearly clutching at straws as this was
clearly the weak point of the Prosecution. The District Judge himself had written
in his judgement that he had the greatest grounds for concern regarding the application
of S.A.M.'s. Mr Hardy tried to reiterate the point that they were subject to judicial
control and could be appealed against. However, he was clearly flustered at this
point and dropped his notes to which the Judge commented “You are huffing and puffing
Mr Hardy!” The Prosecution rested their case at that point for the Defence to conclude.
Mr Fitzgerald started by reminding the Judges that the District Judge had stated
this was a “difficult and troubling” case. He then went on the address the recurrent
issue of “good faith”. He said that he did not doubt the good faith of the U.S.
but the history of a strong alliance could not be taken as one free of disputes.
He mentioned the case of Moazzam Begg, the British Citizen detained in Guantanamo
Bay then subsequently released. This was a clear example where British Citizens
have been detained by the U.S. and the UK-U.S. relationship came secondary to the
interests of the U.S. authorities.
He then made the following points in concluding his presentation of the Appeal:
The long history of accepting assurances and not questioning their
validity had only been in the specific context of cases such as the death penalty.
This assurance is where a part of State law will be dis-applied, that being the
designation of Military Order Number One, or that the duty perceived appropriate
by the President would not be undertaken. In this context, the issues are more complex
and this cannot be compared to past assurances due to this.
Military Order One is commissioned by the President, not by the U.S
embassy from where the diplomatic note arose. He stated that we do not know if it
was sanctioned by the President himself and whether he was even consulted. There
was no history provided by the U.S government as to how the note came into existence
and nor is there any history of authorisation
There was no way for an individual to enforce the diplomatic note
or seek a remedy if it is not adhered to. This point was accepted by the Judge but
he went on to say this was all the more reason to rely on the good faith through
which the note was administered.
The fact that the note was given by a “mature legal democracy” did
not mean the U.S was not open to criticism. There may well be a 150 year history
of an unbroken relationship between the UK and U.S but we still do not, for example,
share their definition of torture. They do still have their own interpretation of
the Law.
The wording of the diplomatic note may seek to dispel the risk of
military trial and designation of Enemy Combatant. However, it does not cover the
risks of Extraordinary Rendition and the issuing of Military Order One, which remains
a real risk. The diplomatic note is not law and can only be taken as a high intention
at most. The Defence emphasised the dangers of relying on such an assurance to eliminate
the very real risk of Military Order One being applied.
Extraordinary Rendition: At this point the Judge stated that if no
other country has expressed an interest in the appellant then there was no evidence
to support these individuals being subjected to this. Mr Fitzgerald stated that
there was overwhelming evidence to support the fact that Extraordinary Rendition
does occur and there are not specified destinations. Mr Fitzergerald went on to
add that it was often the ase where individuals were taken to third countries so
that the ‘dirty work of the U.S. ' was done by others. He then invited the High
Court judges to rule that until the U.S. stops its practice of Extraordinary Rendition,
the U.K must bar the extradition of all Muslims accused of terrorism to the U.S.
S.A.M.'s: Mr Fitzgerald reminded the Judge that the Prosecution were
wilfully withholding the statistics of Muslims held under S.A.M.'s in the U.S. The
Judge then states to the Prosecution that he would not order them to provide them
but would be very keen to see the figures. At first the Prosecution denied that
repeated requests had been made for the figures. This was swiftly corrected when
the Defence pointed out the various letters sent to them in this regard. Then Mr
Hardy, in a moment of fluster and much to the dismay of his colleagues, stood and
promised the Judges he would endeavour to provide the figures. Judge Laws stated
that he looked forward to seeing them. The importance of the figures was upon a
point of law. Should a particularly draconian measure, such as those included in
S.A.M.'s, be disproportionately applied to Muslim defendants, then this in itself
would give reason to bar the extradition.
Long history of strong alliance: The history of the relationship
between the UK . And U.S was a good one, but not one of extradition requests having
been refused to the U.S or by the U.S.
With this final point Mr Fitzgerald concluded. The Judge stated they would need
to reserve judgement as many points had to be considered. He stated that they would
endeavour to give the judgement before 31 st July 2006 . However, in the event this
was not possible, then a judgement would be made in October 2006 (courts would be
closed in August and September for recess). The fight for Babar Ahmad's release
is now in its final stages.
www.freebabarahmad
21/07/06
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